








What can the EU expect from the new Belgian 
government? 
 




The general message is clear from the first pages: 
Belgium will be – again, in some respects – a good 
student of European integration, a driving force 
behind an ever closer Union. The government 
thus explicitly insists on the ‘pro-European 
engagement’ of Belgium and ‘opts resolutely for 
a firm, pro-European attitude.’ As the agreement 
reminds us, ‘a small, open economy’ like Belgium 
can find its salvation only in the embrace of the 
EU. The message gets through, even, it’s true, if 
it sometimes means mentioning certain elements 
that were once commonplace but are no longer  
applicable to all Member States – for example, the 
agreement’s confirmation that Belgium will 
respect its obligations under EU law. 
Does the agreement contain any surprises? Not 
really. There will be no revolution in Belgian 
foreign policy. More precisely, we are witnessing 
a return to a more traditional Belgian politics that 
was dented by the years when the country was co-
ruled by the New Flemish Alliance (N-VA), the 
euroscepticism of whom was increasingly 
evident. The composition of the new government 
itself (socialists, liberals, greens and Flemish 
Christian democrats) aims for the centre and thus 
encourages this return of a traditional Belgian 
attitude towards the European project. The new 
government hopes ‘that Belgium, faithful to its 
history, will continue to build bridges and to 
actively seek a new European consensus.’ On 
more than one count, the text reflects the 
discourse of the State of the Union given by the 
president of the European Commission, Ursula 
von der Leyen, on 16 September 2000. The latter 
certainly views the arrival of this government in a 
positive light. This is fortunate, especially when 
one knows that the first drafts of the agreement 
were apparently less ambitious. 
The political agreement 2 that made the 
new Belgian federal government possible 
mentions Europe nearly 130 times in an 
intentional emphasis. The fact that new 
prime minister Alexander de Croo 
presented his government’s programme 
in the European Parliament – the very 
heart of the Brussels universe – 
constitutes an almost subliminal 
message in line with the content of the 









The analysis that follows endeavours to 
summarise the European dimension of the 
agreement. It is simply an overview. 
WHAT DOES THE AGREEMENT SAY?  
As previously stated, the text of the discourse on 
the State of the Union was certainly on the 
negotiating table. Between the preservation and 
the reinforcement of the Schengen rules, the 
creation of own resources, respect for the rule of 
law (and conditionality in the granting of 
European funds), support for Commission 
initiatives to deal with the pandemic and its 
consequences and so on, the numerous elements 
of the agreement have plenty to delight the 
occupants of Berlaymont. 
As far as the EU internal market is concerned, in 
the broad sense, the government will engage in 
deepening it. It poses European integration as a 
preliminary step necessary to the increase of 
‘levers to control our strategic interests, our 
values and the liberal and democratic norms 
beyond our frontiers.’ 
From a fiscal point of view, the new government 
asks for ‘a form of taxation [...] on digital services’ 
and announces that it will take the initiative in the 
discussions – already underway – at the EU level 
and at the OECD. If no agreement is found at 
either of these levels, Belgium will adopt its own 
regimen in 2023. No longer a question of taking 
the initiative but rather a ‘constructive role’ in the 
concretisation of ‘projects of fiscal European 
harmony and cooperation between Member 
States.’ The agreement mentions the revision of 
VAT, the establishment of a common 
(consolidated) base taxation for corporations, 
and taxes on financial institutions ‘among others’. 
The government positions itself, furthermore, ‘in 
favour of revising the current tax exemption for 
kerosene’. It expresses, lastly, the hope of 
‘arriving at full monetary and fiscal union.’ 
 
At the social level, the new government intends 
to support the Commission in the initiative aimed 
at guaranteeing a minimum wage in the EU – 
welcome support for the Commission when we 
know that the question does not fall within the 
EU’s domain of competences and that whatever 
progress can be made in this area cannot be 
reached without the voluntary collaboration of 
Member States. The new government will 
furthermore continue to ‘actively’ support the 
development of the permanent European 
Unemployment Benefit Scheme currently under 
discussion, as well as ‘the initiatives concerning 
the European guarantee for infants and the 
revised European Youth Guarantee.’ The 
government will not fail, furthermore, to invest 
‘actively in the development of the new European 
Labour Authority and will support the 
establishment of a “social Europol” charged with 
monitoring the posting of workers at European 
level.’ 
At the environmental level, the government 
intends to commit fully to the fulfilment of the 
European Green Deal, notably to reach targets 
for the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions by 
55% by the 2030 horizon and achieve climate 
neutrality by 2050. The agreement thus here once 
again echoes the recent speech on the State of the 
Union. Let us also mention that the government 
intends to support the Commission in its strategy 
on plastics, notably in the ambition of 
harmonising the rules on the material. 
The sixth and final focus of the agreement is 
entitled: ‘Belgium: a strong voice in Europe and 
the world.’ Thus, beyond the frontiers of the EU, 
the agreement evokes Belgium’s attachment to 
‘robust multilateralism’ while underlining that 
‘European integration’ is the ‘most important 
lever’ to achieve this goal: ‘the EU [is] the best 
instrument for defending Belgian interests at the 
global level,’ to confront the ‘great challenges of 
our time’ and protect fundamental rights. The 








ambitions for strategic autonomy, which will 
notably please the president of the European 
Council, Charles Michel. Following the same line 
of thought, the government then pleads with the 
EU to ‘equip itself with a true capacity for 
scientific, industrial and military action that [allow 
it] to be a significant diplomatic actor on the 
world stage’ and support the European Defence 
Fund and PESCO. All this while reiterating its 
attachment to NATO, which must, according to 
the government, remain, ‘the cornerstone of the 
collective defence of Europe.’ Belgium will 
continue, furthermore, to plead in favour of the 
transition from unanimity to a qualified majority 
voting in the decision-making process of the 
CFSP. 
On the question of asylum and immigration, the 
government announces ‘a humane policy for 
people who require protection and a firm return 
policy’. The government adds that ‘Belgium [will] 
show humanity and solidarity in the case of 
situations of acute urgency overseas that require 
the welcoming of vulnerable people.’ In other 
words, between a ‘common asylum policy for 
Europe’, an ‘equitable distribution of 
responsibilities and expenses’ at the European 
level and ‘reinforced external borders’, every 
political hue will be satisfied. Defining the 
Belgian position in the framework of negotiations 
on the future European Pact on Asylum and 
Migration will not, however, be easy – not to 
mention the pressure that will be exercised on 
this government by a ferocious opposition at 
national level on this subject. 
Given that one of the authors of the report is 
none other than Paul Magnette, who, in 2016, led 
the opposition to CETA, many observers will 
have been attentive to the section of the 
agreement on the EU’s common trade policy. If 
the new government insists, on the one hand, on 
the maintenance of an ‘ambitious foreign trade 
strategy, [driven] by securing alliances around 
lasting trade relations’, it reiterates its attachment 
to the inclusion in these agreements of ‘high 
social and environmental standards’ (and human 
rights), giving as examples the ‘fundamental 
norms of the International Labour Organization’, 
compatibility with the Paris Agreement or ‘the 
application of OECD criteria for fiscal 
transparency’. The new government then warns, 
in a tone perhaps more threatening and taking 
account of the ‘previous CETA’, that ‘Belgium 
will not, therefore, accept new trade and 
investment agreements except when these 
standards are applicable and binding.’ It seeks 
nevertheless to reassure by stressing that it ‘will 
be a trustworthy partner throughout the 
ratification of trade agreements.’ As for treaties 
already signed, they ‘will be presented for 
ratification in view of a debate in the [federal] 
parliament on the basis of an impact analysis or 
the general interests of the Belgian economy and, 
in particular, the chapter on sustainable 
development will be evaluated.’ It remains to be 
seen what will underlie this impact analysis. 
Finally, on the thorny subject of dispute 
resolution that led Belgium to ask the European 
Court of Justice on the compatibility of the 
mechanism envisaged by CETA with EU law, the 
government confirms that Belgium will 
contribute to the creation of a multilateral 
investment tribunal. As long as this tribunal does 
not exist, the government will ensure that future 
agreements foresee ‘the creation of a tribunal for 
dispute resolution that offers substantial 
guarantees concerning its independence and 
respect for the rule of law.’ 
Finally, aware that Belgium is among those 
countries most affected in the event of an 
absence of an agreement on the future 
partnership between the EU and the UK – and 
even if one is struck – the text devotes a 
paragraph to Brexit, reiterating that Belgium 
wishes to achieve ‘the most ambitious, balanced 
and coherent agreement possible’ that respects 
‘the founding principles of the EU’. In the 








minimum agreement, ‘special aid for the regions 
and sectors affected should be furnished from 
EU budgets.’ 
HOW WILL THE GOVERNMENT PROCEED?  
The institutional complexity of Belgium has 
historically made complicate the definition of a 
Belgian position on different dossiers. The new 
government ‘intends to make an important 
contribution to modernisation, to the improvement 
of efficiency and to the deepening of state 
structures.’ The agreement adds that ‘the conception 
and [...] the execution of Belgian foreign and 
European policy will be realised through cooperative 
federalism. In this, pragmatism will prevail in the 
interest of a strong representation of the country, of 
its citizens and its businesses.’ One of the first 
dossiers likely to put this cooperative federalism to 
the test will be the question of the ‘correct 
distribution between [the federal authority], the 
federated and local entities’ of benefits drawn from 
the Next Generation EU recovery plan. This 
institutional work is, for many dossiers, a necessary 
prerequisite to once more become a strong partner 
in European integration. 
Competence for European affairs has been added to 
the portfolio of the new minister of foreign affairs, 
who is none other than the outbound prime 
minister, Sophie Wilmès. One interesting 
institutional development that would have echoed 
similar developments in other Member States would 
have been integrating competence for European 
affairs into the prime minister’s chancellery. It will 
not happen this time, and that is not necessarily a bad 
thing. The fact that foreign policy, European policy, 
and overseas trade3  (to the extent to which it is of 
federal competence) arise from the same portfolio is 
fortunate, because the political mosaic could have 
caused a fragmentation that would have introduced 
checks and reciprocal paralyses. Furthermore, to 
choose a former prime minister, accustomed to 
European circles, is a strategic choice and judicious 
policy. The same applies to the choice of the prime 
minister, Alexander de Croo, for whom the 
European scene is no secret due to his long 
ministerial experience. To maintain a liberal in this 
post should above all permit – in the context of 
current foreign policy – the maintenance of good 
relations with other Benelux states and with the 
French Republic. The choice of a Dutch speaker 
could furthermore have the effect of recharging 
relations with the Netherlands. 
In conclusion, the agreement does not indicate the 
future position of the federal Belgian government on 
all the current European dossiers, but it mentions 
quite many. The outlines are thus traced, delivering a 
general message that is resolutely pro-European and 
will be useful to bear in mind, particularly in view of 
the Belgian presidency of the Council of the EU for 
the first half of 2024. This will mark the last months 
of the government (if all goes well till then) but also 
those of the European legislature in session. If the 
new government wants this presidency to be the 
culmination of certain dossiers, it must then engage 
itself very proactively in the European agenda 
without delay. 
It must nevertheless equally be borne in mind that 
this agreement is the fruit of a compromise between 
no fewer than seven political parties from four 
different political families, something that will not fail 
to astonish many foreign observers once more. This 
without doubt explains the patchwork of scraps of 
programmes from these different parties, the 
assemblage of intentions that could prove difficult to 
reconcile and the concrete realisation of which risks 
being ridden with pitfalls. But the optimism is 
present, and the declared ambition is grand: in 2030, 
the bicentenary year of Belgium’s independence, the 
government wishes that the country appears once 
more ‘in Europe as a model of economic dynamism, 
of effective solidarity and sustainable development.’ 
The date has been set. 
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1 This brief analysis was written on 1 October 2020, the day after the publication of the agreement. The 
author would like to thank Mr Jean-Louis De Brouwer, Director of the European Affairs Program at the 
Egmont Institute, for his insightful comments. 
 
2 Rapport des Formateurs/Verlag van de Formateurs, Paul Magnette and Alexander de Croo, 30 September 
2020. 
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